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a b s t r a c t  
 
The traditional approach makes investment in innovation constrained by market 
structure. This paper explores the causality from innovation to market structure. 
Omitting this causality direction on empirical models may explain empirical problems 
and contradictions on these models.  
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    The traditional approach makes investment in innovation constrained by market 
structure. In fact, probably the causality runs both ways. This paper explores the 
causality from innovation to market structure and shows that this in fact probable. 
Omitting this causality direction on empirical models may explain empirical problems 
and contradictions on these models. For example, Liberman (1987) finds a positive 
correlation between market concentration and innovation, and Scherer (1984) finds that 
in some cases, small firms are relatively more likely to make major innovations. Other 
studies report results that seem contradictory: Cohen, Levin and Mowery (1994) 
conclude that R&D intensity varies with firm size in some industries and not others, and 
where it does vary, it may be negatively or positively related to size. This paper presents 
some answers to these puzzles. 
    This is paper presents a different approach from the standard paradigm that relates 
innovation to market structure. It considers inventions exogenous, (see Kato 2005 for a 
different approach) and investigates the effects of simultaneous investment in both 
horizontal expansion (product innovation) as in Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) and Romer (1990), 
and vertical expansion (process innovation), a.k.a. quality ladders, as in Aghion and 
Howit (1992). 
 
2. The model  
 
Firms and markets 
 
There are s markets, and each has vk,t endogenously determined firms in moment t, 
k=1,…,s. For now let's define market as a strong break in the chain of substitution on 
the demand side. A more formal definition will be given later in this paper. Each firm is 
assumed to use a production function of the form:  
 
(1)                                                             xi,t = Ai,t 
 
That is, the quantity produced of each variety i in each period t, xi,t is equal to the 
technological level in production, Ai,t,of that variety. All varieties are heterogeneous and 
each variety is produced by a single firm. The number of varieties produced by firm j 
are nj,t. 
The profit function for any firm j takes the following form, for each period t:  
 
                                                     nj,t                           nj,t 
 (2)                                      Πj,t = ∑  xi,t pi,t –Ψc j,t –Ψ ∑d i,t 
                                                    i=1                        i=1 
 
Where xi,t and pi,t are respectively the quantity and the price of variety i. There are only 
two types of costs: cj,t is spending on product innovation and ∑
n j,t
 d i,t total spending on 
process innovation. Marginal cost of both types of innovation is assumed to be constant 
and equal to Ψ. 
 
Assumption 1. The total number of product innovations in each period t made by each 
individual firm is never very large. This means that when optimizing, each firm will 
take as null the impact of an additional variety on its profits from the varieties that 
existed in previous periods.  
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This assumption is necessary for the sake of the analytical simplicity of the model. (this 
can be easily seen in the appendix). 
 
Invention and innovation 
 
Process innovation follows the process:  
 
(3)                                        Ai,t+1  –A i,t= λk . Ai,t . di,t   
 
and product innovation follows the process:  
 
(4)                                        ni,t+1  –ni,t = λk . ni,t . cj,t   
 
Where λk is the (exogenous) invention rate which is assumed to be the same for both 
kinds of innovation processes. Note that this is a constant that would correspond to a 
Poisson arrival rate in a model with uncertainty. New varieties are created with initial 
technology A0. 
 
Assumption 2. There is a potentially different invention rate λk for each one of the k = 
1,…,s  markets.  
 
What is assumed is that each market has its own invention rate because it corresponds to 




Following Dixit-Stiglitz (1977), the demand for variety i in period t is:  
 
(5)                                  x
d
i,t = (pi,t/ Pt)
σ
k . [yk,t/mt] 
   
The demand yk,t corresponds to the total demand that in period t is directed to the 
industry k to which variety i belongs to. As this is a partial equilibrium model, it is 
considered exogenous. Pt and pi,t are respectively the price level and the price of variety 
i in period t in market k. (Wherever clear from the context to which market they belong, 
these shall not be indexed by k.) The parameter σk measures the degree of linkage 
between submarkets of the same market, in the Sutton (1998) fashion. Lower σk  means, 
on the demand side, less substitutability between varieties to the consumers, and on the 
supply side it may represent the existence of scope economies in production. The total 
number of varieties in the industry in period t are mt = ∑
vk nj,t. 
I will now follow a third assumption. 
 
Assumption 3. There is independence between different markets. This means: a) there is 
a potentially different σk for each market. b) varieties are only substitutes between 
submarkets of the same market and never between markets. Any scope economies that 
may exist apply only inside the same market. c) there is a fixed and exogenous demand 








Each firm's problem is to maximize the inter-temporal present discounted value of 
profits:  
 
                                                                                             ∞ 
(6)                                                 sup (∑ β
t
 Πj,t) 
                                                            t=0 
                                                                                                          
The state variables for each firm are the technology level for each one of the existing 
varieties A i,t , i=1,...,nj,t and the total number of varieties nj,t. The control variables are 
the amount of spending on innovation on each one of the varieties i on period t (process 
innovation), di,t  , i=1,...,nj,t and the amount of spending on the development of new 




It turns out that a unique closed-form solution exists for the optimal spending on each 
type of investment on innovation for each period t. (the proof can be found in the 
appendix). 
 
                               
  (7)                             di,t  = ф
 











                                                                        
and  
                            

























The long run 
 
The long run condition is: 
                                                                               ∞ 
(9)                                      vk:    (∑ β
t
 Πj,t) = 0   for all j.  
                                                   t=0
                         
 
                                                                                                
Market structure 
 
It is possible to show that: 
 
(10)                                       (∂ dj,t / ∂σk) / ( cj,t / ∂σk ) > 1 
 
Where dj,t = ∑
n j,t
 di,t this is, total spending on process innovation. The intuition for the 
above result is as follows. The larger is the linkage between submarkets σk (more 
elasticity of substitution to the consumer), the more will firms invest in process 
innovation relatively to product innovation because when investing in process 
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innovation they will more easily "steal" demand from other trajectories (see Sutton 
1998). 
    Regarding the long run market structure: 
 
(11)                                                (∂vk / ∂λk) < 0 
 
This means that markets characterized by a large numbers of scientific discoveries will 
have, ceteris paribus, a smaller concentration of firms. The intuition is that a small 
number of firms are required to invest a large amount in innovation. 
    Also: 
 
(12)                                               (∂vk / ∂σk) < 0  
 
This means that a higher linkage between submarkets is positively related to market 
concentration. The intuition is related to the condition (10): markets with stronger 
market linkages are more prone to a small number of process inventing firms. 
   Finally: 
 
(13)                                         (∂vk / ∂ dj,t + cj,t ) < 0 
  
Total investment on innovation is positively related to market concentration. The 
intuition is the following: Suppose that on period t-1, all firms invest a given amount on 
innovation. For some reason, on period t that amount increases. Note that in the next 
periods firms will have more capacity, i.e. will have products of superior quality and a 
larger number of varieties that otherwise would have existed if the investment in 
innovation had stayed in the original level. Because of this, if all other variables remain 
constant (notably demand) the market is capable of holding an inferior number of firms 
that otherwise would have been. Thus, concentration on that market rises.  
 
 3. Conclusion  
 
   Markets characterised by different degrees of linkage between submarkets and 
invention rates will have different market structures. Traditional empirical studies do 
not distinguish process from product innovation, and so are led to find conflicting 



















Proof of equations (7) and (8): The solution can be obtained using dynamic 
programming. The objective function is (6). The constraints are (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5). 
The state variables are nj,t and Ai,t for i=1,..., nj,t. The control variables are cj,t and di,t for 
i=1,..., nj,t.  
 
We are now able to set up the Bellman equation:  
 
(A1)            V(Ai,t, nj,t) = sup [ Πj,t + β V(Ai,t+1, , nj,t+1 | Ai,t, nj,t) ] 
  
The first-order conditions are:  
 
                                              ∂ V(Ai,t+1, , nj,t+1 | Ai,t, nj,t) 
(A2)                     Ψ = β   
  ___________________________________
  
                                                               ∂ d1,t 
 
 
                                                                . . . 
 
                                
                                           ∂ V(Ai,t+1, , nj,t+1 ∣ Ai,t, nj,t) 
(A3)                     Ψ = β   
____________________________________
    
                                                           ∂ dnj,t,t 
 
 
                                            ∂ V(Ai,t+1, , nj,t+1 ∣ Ai,t, nj,t) 
(A4)                     Ψ = β   
_____________________________________
    
                                                            ∂ cj,t 
 
 
   These correspond to the usual marginal cost equals marginal revenue conditions.  
   Solving the first order conditions (A2) to (A3) is straightforward. After using the 
chain rule on the right hand side and substituting restriction (3), when solving in order 
to di,t we get equation (7). 
   For solving the right hand side of (A4) it is necessary to use assumption 1.  
Using the chain rule:  
 
                                             ∂ V(Ai,t+1, , nj,t+1 ∣ Ai,t, nj,t)          ∂ nj,t 
(A5)                     Ψ = β   
_____________________________________
   
___________ 
 
                                                              ∂ nj,t                           ∂ cj,t 
 
development of the second term:  
 
                                         ∂ V(Ai,t+1, , nj,t+1 ∣ Ai,t, nj,t)     
(A6)                     
           _____________________________________
   = 










) Pt+1 [yk,t+1 /(mt+1+1)]
 1/σ
k  – [ ∑ Ai,t
(1-1/σ
k
) Pt+1 (yk,t+1 /mt+1)
1/σ
k – ∑ Ai,t
(1-1/σ
k
) Pt+1 (yk,t+1 /mt+1+1)
1/σ
k ] 
                                                             i=1                                               i=1 
 
 
                                                                   equal to zero by assumption 1 
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